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The FTCA Discretionary Function Exception
Nullifies $25 Million Malpractice Judgment Against the DCAA:
A Sigh of Relief Concludes the DIVAD Contract Saga
Major Steven L. Schooner
Individual Mobilization Augmentee, Contract and Fiscal Law Department,
The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army;
Associate Professor of Government Contracts Law
George Washington University Law School
Introduction:  A Welcome Reversal of Fortune
Fortunately, it was kite-flying season at Fort Belvoir when
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decided General Dynamics Corp. v. United States.1  Most
observers assume that the collective sigh of relief grew to gale
force.2  In ending two decades of litigation involving the Divi-
sional Air Defense (DIVAD) gun system,3 the Ninth Circuit
reversed a 1996 federal district court decision4 awarding Gen-
eral Dynamics more than $25 million in damages due to profes-
sional malpractice committed by the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA).
The $25 million that remains in the general treasury pales in
comparison to the potential impact of the case.  Until the Ninth
Circuit’s decision, the DIVAD case appeared to be the first suc-
cessful use of the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA)5 by a gov-
ernment contractor to pursue a professional malpractice claim
against a federal agency.6  At least for now, such liability returns
to the realm of legal theory and advocacy, rather than harsh
reality for the government.
This article:  (1) briefly summarizes the history of the Gen-
eral Dynamics case, explaining how a routine contractual com-
pliance audit lead to a $25 million malpractice award against
the DCAA; (2) introduces the discretionary function exception
to the FTCA, which General Dynamics was able to avoid at the
trial level in recovering its attorney’s fees based upon the
DCAA’s actions; (3) examines the application of the discretion-
ary function exception in the context of prosecutorial discre-
tion, which led to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in General
Dynamics; (4) discusses two significant cases, analyzed by the
Ninth Circuit in General Dynamics that demonstrate the fragile
boundaries of the discretionary function exception; (5)
describes guidance from the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
government counsel faced with raising the discretionary func-
tion exception to dismiss FTCA actions; and (6) concludes by
acknowledging that efforts to “reign in” the scope of the discre-
tionary function exception to the FTCA are sure to continue.
Brief Recitation of a Long History7
The DIVAD litigation arose from General Dynamics’ com-
petition for a 1978 developmental contract.  Following a subse-
quent compliance audit, the DCAA informed the Naval
Investigative Service and the DOJ of suspected labor mischarg-
ing by General Dynamics.  In conducting that audit, the DCAA
failed to distinguish between a firm fixed-price contract and a
firm fixed-price (best efforts) contract.8  The DCAA proceeded
to issue an audit report asserting that General Dynamics fraud-
ulently mischarged more than $8 million on the DIVAD con-
1.   139 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1998).
2.   See, e.g., DCAA Director Takes Heart in Reversal of DIVAD Malpractice Award, 98-4 Costs, Pricing & Accounting Rep. (Fed. Pubs) 26 (Apr. 1998) (reporting
that DCAA Director William H. Reed, in a 6 April 1998 memorandum, opined that the appellate court decision “makes it clear that DCAA’s referral of suspected
wrongdoing or its support of investigative agencies will not be grounds for a successful lawsuit”).  See also DCAA: Auditors Shouldn’t Fear Lawsuits in Wake of
Reversal of DIVAD Case, 69 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 428 (Apr. 20, 1998); “Discretionary Function” Exemption Shields DCAA – Ninth Circuit Reverses Professional
Malpractice Action, 98-3 Costs, Pricing & Accounting Rep. (Fed. Pubs) 17 (Mar. 1998); Robert M. Cowen, Ninth Circuit Panel Reverses General Dynamics’ $26M
Award for DCAA Audit Negligence on DIVAD Contract, Rules U.S. Is Immune From Suit Under FTCA, 69 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 370 (Apr. 6, 1998); Prosecutorial
Immunity Shields DCAA–Ninth Circuit Reverses Malpractice Award Against DCAA, 40 TH E GOV’T CON TRACTO R 166, Apr. 8, 1998.
3.  Divisional Air Defense (DIVAD) referred to a prototype divisional air defense system. Ford Aerospace Corporation eventually was selected for the DIVAD pro-
duction contract.  The Department of Defense (DOD) invested approximately $1.8 billion and seven years on the DIVAD gun system before cancelling the program
in 1985.  See generally Weinberger Scraps DIVAD Program, 44 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 508 (Sept. 9, 1985).
4.   No. CV 89-6762JGD, 1996 WL 20025 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1996).
5.   28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 1998).
6.   This was not the first large-scale attack by a government contractor under the FTCA.  Government contracts practitioners may be familiar with the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA, discussed at length below, due to recent coverage of Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.  See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.
487 U.S. 500 (1988) (barring a suit against a Marine Corps contractor for the negligent design of helicopter hatch).
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tract.  Unfortunately, the DCAA “negligently prepared” the
audit report.9
Based on the audit report, the DOJ issued a grand jury sub-
poena and obtained millions of documents relating to the
DIVAD contract.  In addition, the DOJ interviewed numerous
witnesses and conducted an extensive investigation.  Eventu-
ally, the grand jury indicted General Dynamics and four of its
executives and employees on conspiracy and false statement
charges.10  This case, possibly the most high-profile fraud pros-
ecution of its time, generated widespread interest.11  After years
of investigation and litigation (in multiple fora) the DOJ
“gained an understanding of the significance of the differences”
between the two types of contracts.12  The DOJ then “forth-
rightly moved to voluntarily dismiss the indictment.”13
After the DOJ dismissed the indictment, General Dynamics
returned to federal court to recover its massive costs in defend-
ing the case.  In describing General Dynamics’ situation, Judge
Fernandez14 stated:  “Fortunately for the cause of justice, Gen-
eral Dynamics and its employees could afford to keep fighting;
unfortunately, it cost them a lot of money to do so.”15  This was
not hyperbole; General Dynamics sought $29 million for the
attorney’s fees that it paid to defend the fraud prosecution and
a related civil action.16
7.   See Contract Law Note,  Forewarned is Forearmed:  DCAA Held Liable for $25 Million in Damages for Accounting Malpractice, ARM Y LAW., Sept. 1996, at 37
[hereinafter Forewarned]. Those interested in additional details of the case or its seemingly endless tour of the court system should consult this earlier coverage or
some of the following analyses not referenced elsewhere in this article.  See, e.g., General Dynamics Awarded $26M in DIVAD Case, Court Finds DCAA Negligently
Conducted Audit, 65 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 392 (Apr. 15, 1996); General Dynamics’ $29M Claim for DIVADS Defense Costs Not Time Barred, 63 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 533 (Apr. 24, 1995); ASBCA Declines to Hear DIVADS Breach Claim Pending Resolution of Tort Claim in Court, 57 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 49 (Jan. 13,
1992); Hearing Set on McKenna Cuneo Disqualification, 55 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 688 (May 20, 1991); McKenna & Cuneo Disqualified from DIVADS Case, 55
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 479 (Apr. 15, 1991); Gov’t May Be Held Liable for Professional Malpractice in Conducting DIVAD Audit, 54 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 747
(Nov. 19, 1990); Gov’t, General Dynamics Spar Over $29.2M Suit to Recover DIVAD Defense Costs, 53 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 740 (May 21, 1990); General Dynam-
ics Sues to Recover $29.2M in Damages from DIVAD Case, 52 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 952 (Nov. 27, 1989); Judge Dismisses DIVAD Indictment Against General
Dynamics Executives, 47 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 1155 (June 29, 1987); General Dynamics Renews Call to Dismiss DIVAD Indictments, Hearing to be Held Today,
47 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 1125 (June 22, 1987).
8.   General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 139 F.3d 1280, 1282 (9th. Cir. 1998).  “In a pure fixed-price contract, the bargain is stated in terms of a fixed amount
of compensation with no formula or technique for varying the price in the event of unforeseen contingencies.”  JOH N CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., FORM A TIO N
OF
 GO VERN M ENT CON TRA CTS 1080 (3d ed. 1988).  “A fixed-price, level-of-effort term contract is similar to a cost reimbursement term type contract except that the
price is paid upon the incurrence of the specified number of labor hours.”  Id. at 1180.  Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.207-2 explains that, with this type of contract,
“payment is based on the effort expended rather than on the results achieved.”  GEN ERA L SERVS. AD M IN. ET. A L., FED ERAL ACQU ISITIO N REG. 16.207 (June 1997).
9.   “DCAA, unaccountably, failed to recognize, or seek information about, the vast difference between a firm fixed-price contract and a firm fixed-price (best efforts)
contract.”  General Dynamics, 139 F.3d at 1282.
10.   Id. at 1282.  The DOJ filed charges pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001 (1982).
11.   Before its conclusion, the case involved then Attorney General Ed Meese, former Massachussets Governor William Weld (then a senior official in the DOJ), and
former General Dynamics executive and NASA Administrator James M. Beggs.  Mr. Beggs, one of the named defendants, took a leave of absence from NASA to
prepare his defense.  See General Dynamics, 139 F.3d at 1287;  see also Navy Suspends General Dynamics After Fraud Indictment, Holds Sub Bids Open, 44 Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA) 1005 (Dec. 9, 1985).
12.   General Dynamics, 139 F.3d at 1282.  See Forewarned, supra note 7, at 37-38.
13.   General Dynamics, 139 F.3d at 1282.
14.   Surprisingly, commentators have not addressed Judge Ferdinand F. Fernandez’s prior involvement with this litigation. Before moving to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Judge Fernandez presided over this litigation as a district court judge in California.  In 1986, Judge Fernandez, in an effort to obtain clarity on questions
related to the type of contract in issue, sought an advisory opinion from the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA).  See United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1497 (C.D. Cal. 1986).  The list of questions submitted by Judge Fernandez offered some insight into the confusion that must have
confounded both the DCAA and the DOJ.  Nonetheless, the ASBCA concluded, among other things, that they lacked jurisdiction to render such an advisory opinion.
See General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 33633, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,607.  “Issuance of advisory type of decisions or recommendations is not the Board’s function under
either the CDA or its present charter.”  Id. at 99,205.  The board previously found that it lacked jurisdiction over this matter because there was no contracting officer’s
decision and because there was a related criminal action pending in Federal District Court.  See General Dynamics Corp., Pomona Division, ASBCA No. 32297, 86-
2 BCA ¶ 18,903.  Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the ASBCA that, among other things, the district court lacked the authority to refer these issues to the
ASBCA.  See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987).  See generally Stay of General Dynamics Case Pending Referal to ASBCA
Ruled Improper, 47 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 717 (Apr. 27, 1987); Government Appeals Referral to ASBCA in General Dynamics DIVAD Case, 46 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 735 (Oct. 27, 1986); Federal Judge Refers to ASBCA Questions About General Dynamics’ DIVAD Overrun, 46 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 483 (Sept. 22, 1986).
The Ninth Circuit’s 1987 decision was cited frequently before and after the amendment to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.  See 41 U.S.C.A. § 609(f) (West 1998),
as amended by Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, Pub. L. No. 103-355, tit II, § 2354, 108 Stat. 3323 (1994).  The Contract Disputes Act now permits the federal
district courts to request advisory opinions from boards of contract appeals (BCAs).  Id.  See generally Albert A. Cortese & Frank M. Rapoport, Implications of Section
2354 of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Which Gives Federal District Courts Authority to Seek Advisory Opinions From Boards of Contract Appeals
in Contract Fraud Cases, 62 Fed. Cont. Rep. 443, 444 (BNA) (Oct. 31, 1994).
15.   General Dynamics, 139 F.3d at 1282.
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In this phase of the proceedings, lacking another legal ave-
nue for the recovery of its attorney’s fees, General Dynamics
advanced a somewhat novel legal theory.  It alleged that, under
the FTCA, the DCAA had committed professional malpractice
in performing the audit that led to the indictment.17  In the trial
and appellate courts, the government responded that General
Dynamics could not recover under the FTCA for professional
malpractice committed by the DCAA.  The government argued
that, because of the FTCA’s discretionary function exception,
the courts lacked jurisdiction to provide General Dynamics a
remedy.18
The district court disagreed with the government, finding
that the DCAA ultimately caused the damage for which Gen-
eral Dynamics sought recovery.  Finding that the DCAA’s neg-
ligence in preparing and submitting the audit report was not a
discretionary function, the district court awarded tort damages
to General Dynamics.  On appeal, the government continued to
assert that the discretionary function exception specifically
applied to the DOJ (i.e. the prosecutors).  In addition, the gov-
ernment asserted that General Dynamics and the district court
had misdirected their focus towards the DCAA.  The Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed and reversed the lower court’s decision.19  These
issues (the relationship between actions taken by the DCAA
and the subsequent decisions and steps taken by the DOJ)
expose the Achilles heel of the discretionary function excep-
tion.
The Discretionary Function Exception to FTCA Liability
The FTCA, like other laws that permit suits against the
United States, is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.20
“That waiver of sovereign immunity is subject to a number of
exceptions.  If an exception applies, sovereign immunity is not
waived, and no subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”21  The rele-
vant FTCA exception here dictates that the court lacks jurisdic-
tion over claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function.”22
Because the discretionary function exception clearly covers
prosecutorial discretion,23 General Dynamics recognized that it
could not seek recovery solely upon the DOJ’s decision to pro-
ceed with its cases.  Accordingly, General Dynamics “pointed
the finger” at the DCAA.24  The district court “took the bait”
and held the DCAA liable under the FTCA.25
16.   The total amount of reimbursement awarded to General Dynamics by the district court eventually came to $25,880,752.  See id. at 1281.
17.   See Forewarned, supra note 7, at 38-39; notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
18.   The discretionary function exception, states that the FTCA shall not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance of the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added).  As the text indicates, section 2680(a) also contains the “due care” exception.  See generally Lively v. United
States, 870 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1989); Doe v. Stevens, 851 F.2d 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing the due care exception).
19.   One dissenting judge disagreed with the majority’s reasoning regarding the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.  Nonetheless, the judge would have
denied recovery because General Dynamics’ claim was time-barred.  See General Dynamics, 139 F.3d at 1287-88.
20.   In the United States, the origins of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, based upon the principle that the king could do no wrong, remains a mystery.  Developed
primarily through the common law, the doctrine quickly became well entrenched in the legal system.  “A sovereign is exempt from suit, because of any formal con-
ception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.”  Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 348, 353 (1907).  See generally KEN NETH CU LP DAV IS, ADM IN ISTRA TIV E LAW  797-98 (1951) (suggesting that this
fragmentary, haphazard situation led Congress to enact the FTCA in 1946).  “Legal scholars and political scientists have been virtually unanimous in judging most of
the legislative and judicial relaxations of sovereign immunity to be fragmentary and haphazard and to allow many occasions for injustice to continue.”  Paul H. Sand-
ers, Foreword, 9 LA W & CO NTEM P. PROB. 179 (1942).  Sanders also aptly notes that sovereign immunity “has persisted in modern law to a degree which would aston-
ish most citizens.”  Id.  But see Joshua I. Schwartz, Assembling WINSTAR: Triumph of the Ideal of Congruence in Government Contract Law, 26 PUB. CON T. L.J. 481
(1997); Michael Grunwald, Lawsuit Surge May Cost U.S. Billions, WA SH. PO ST, Aug. 10, 1998, at A1 (discussing an example of a successful, large-scale assault based
upon sovereign acts of the government). 
21.   General Dynamics Corp., 139 F.3d at 1283 (citing Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1451 (9th Cir. 1996)).
22.   Id. at 1283 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (West 1998); Sabow, 93 F.3d at 1451).  Courts employ two steps to determine whether the discretionary function bars
a suit.  See id. (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988)).  “First, does the challenged action involve an element of choice or judgment? . . . .
Second, is any judgment at issue of the sort Congress intended to shield?”  United Cook Inlet Drift Assocs. v. Trinidad Corp. (In re Glacier Bay), 71 F.3d 1447, 1450
(9th Cir. 1995).  See Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315 (1991).  Professor Davis writes that Congress “carefully preserve[d] sovereign immunity with respect to”
discretionary functions.  DAV IS, supra note 20, at 798. 
23.   On the subject of prosecutorial discretion, the Ninth Circuit stated:  “The decision whether or not to prosecute a given individual is a discretionary function for
which the United States is immune from liability.  The exercise of that discretion is by no means easy, and prosecutors do make mistakes.”  General Dynamics, 139
F.3d at 1283 (citations omitted).
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The appellate court, however, realized that it could not “sim-
ply look at the surface of a complaint for the purpose of ascer-
taining the true basis of an attack upon something the
government has done.”26  The court believed that further exam-
ination was required.
Limiting the Reach of the FTCA:
“The Buck Stopped at the Prosecutors”
The appellate court analyzed the nature of prosecutorial dis-
cretion and properly concluded that prosecutors, not the inves-
tigators upon whom they rely, exercise that discretion.  The
court refused to believe that the DCAA’s actions ultimately
injured General Dynamics.  Regardless of the plaintiff’s care-
fully structured pleading, General Dynamics had incurred attor-
ney’s fees based upon the DOJ’s actions (not DCAA’s).
The court accepted its responsibility to look at the facts,
rather than to accept plaintiff’s theory, as pled.  “We see no rea-
son to accord amaranthine obeisance to a plaintiff’s designation
of targeted employees when we refuse to be bound by his
choice of claim label.”27  The court realized that General
Dynamics targeted the DCAA, rather than the DOJ, because
General Dynamics knew that the discretionary function excep-
tion insulated the DOJ from FTCA liability.  “We may take cog-
nizance of the fact that a target has been selected for the
purpose of evading the discretionary choice of the persons who
actually caused the damage—here the prosecutors’, who were
pushing a criminal (and civil) attack upon General Dynamics
and its employees . . . .”28  In this respect, the court realized that
this case was not unusual.  “Prosecutors do not usually do all of
their own investigation, so a victorious defendant could almost
always argue that this or that report was negligently pre-
pared.”29  As a result, the court refused to leave the DCAA
exposed to FTCA liability.
The court, however, was neither apologetic for nor unduly
deferential to the government’s actions.30  The court stated:
Perhaps the prosecutors should have listened
to General Dynamics’ lawyers; perhaps they
should have done more of their own investi-
gation and spoken to government employees
who really knew what the contract meant;
perhaps they were merely mislead by the
arcane differences between the [contractual
definitions] . . . perhaps reasonable minds
could, even today, differ about the true mean-
ing of the contractual words.31
Regardless of the quality of the DCAA’s work, the DCAA
lacked the authority to bring either a criminal or civil action
against General Dynamics.  The audit report could not evolve
into a legal action because it produced no self-executing rem-
edy.  Although the prosecutors obviously relied upon DCAA’s
work, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ills that befell Gen-
eral Dynamics derived from the discretion exercised by the
DOJ.  The court makes clear that, as a matter of law and fact,
“the buck stopped with the prosecutors.” 32  The prosecutors
were ultimately responsible for the decisions that prompted the
lawsuit.  Given the exceptions to the FTCA, however, the
human fallibility of the prosecutors could not lead to recovery.33
24.   “General Dynamics . . . recognizes that it cannot succeed in an attack on that revetment and adopts the ancient tactic of attempting to circumvent it instead.  That
is, it seeks to posture its case as an attack on the DCAA rather than as an attack on the prosecutors.”  Id.
25.   Id. at 1282.
26.   Id.
27.   Id.  To be amaranthine is to be unfading or everlasting.  To the extent that obeisance suggests a bodily movement expressing deferential courtesy or homage, one
could conclude that Judge Fernandez was disinclined to simply concur with the plaintiff’s characterization of its cause of action.
28.   Id. (emphasis added).
29.   Id. at 1283-84.
30.   “The actions taken . . . will not be recorded as the Department of Justice’s finest hour, nor, considering the ultimate candid request for dismissal, was it the Depart-
ment’s darkest one.”  Id. at 1286.
31.   Id.  As the dissent stated:  “That the Department is immune from suit in this case does not mean it is immune from criticism.”  Id. at 1287 (O’Scannlain, C.J.,
dissenting).
32.   The court stated:
Where . . . the harm actually flows from the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion, an attempt to recharacterize the action as something else must
fail.  And there can be no doubt that the buck stopped with the prosecutors.  True, they had a report from the DCAA, but the decision to prosecute
was all their own.  They were not required to prosecute, and were not forced to do so. . . .  In fact, they gathered a great deal of information and
even met with General Dynamics’ redoubtable lawyers before the prosecution went forward.
Id. at 1286 (emphasis added). 
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A Healthy Tension:  Expanding and Shrinking
The Discretionary Function Exception
In its opinion, the court thoroughly discussed Fisher Bros.
Sales, Inc. v. United States,34 and United Cook Inlet Drift Asso-
ciates v. Trinidad Corp. (In re The Glacier Bay).35  While both
cases “strike a similar chord,” they also appear to represent
“opposite ends of a spectrum” in defining the bounds of the dis-
cretionary function exception.36  This spectrum offers insight
into the interplay between officials that exercise discretion,
those that perform duties that influence the exercise of that dis-
cretion, and the connection  between truly discretionary acts
and the injuries incurred by FTCA plaintiffs.  In examining
these cases, the court concluded that it “cannot wholly ignore
causation concepts when a robust exercise of discretion inter-
venes between an alleged government wrongdoer and the harm
suffered by a plaintiff.”37
Fisher Bros. arose from the 1989 incident involving an alle-
gation of tampering with Chilean fruit.  An anonymous caller
told the United States Embassy that Chilean fruit being
exported to the United States would contain cyanide.  As a
result, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) detained
incoming fruit from Chile, tested it, found no poison, and
declared the call a hoax.  A second, more specific call, however,
led to additional testing and some evidence of tampering on
three Chilean grapes.  Based on the information available, the
FDA Commissioner refused entry of Chilean fruit into the
country and required Chilean fruit to be destroyed in domestic
distribution channels.
Chilean growers, exporters, and a shipper, along with Amer-
ican importers and distributors, sued the U.S. government.  The
plaintiffs alleged that “the lab technicians were negligent . . .
[and] but for this negligence, the Commissioner would not have
issued his orders and the Chilean fruit business for the spring
season of 1989 would not have been destroyed.”38  Both the trial
court and the appellate court found that the Commissioner’s
decisions “were policy decisions protected by the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA.”39
The reality here is that the injuries . . . were
caused by the Commissioner’s decisions and,
as a matter of law, their claims are therefore,
“based upon” those decisions.  Any other
view would defeat the purpose of the discre-
tionary function exception.  In situations like
this where the injury complained of is caused
by a regulatory policy decision, the fact of
the matter is that there is no difference in the
quality or quantity of interference occasioned
by judicial second guessing, whether the
plaintiff purports to be attacking the data
base on which the policy is founded or
acknowledges outright that he or she is chal-
lenging the policy itself.40
The court acknowledged that policy-makers must make judg-
ments regarding “the reliability, adequacy, and significance of
the information available to [them].”41  Such is the nature of
exercising discretion.  Unlike the court’s decision in Glacier
Bay,42 this conclusion clearly distinguishes between the official
33.   “A mistake was made, but, because prosecutors do not have ichor in their veins, mistakes can be expected from time to time.  Mistakes, however, do not necessarily
equal governmental liability.”  Id. at 1286.
34.   46 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 806.
35.   71 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995).  The dissent in General Dynamics relied upon Glacier Bay to conclude that “DCAA clearly was not immune.”  General Dynamics,
139 F.3d at 1288 (O’Scannlain, C.J., dissenting).
36.   See Note, Government Tort Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (1998);  Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion:  Judicial Interpretation of the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47 ME. L. REV. 365 (1995); Barry R. Goldman, Can the King Do No Wrong?  A New Look at the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 GA. L. REV. 837 (1992); Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Gov-
ernment Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871 (1991); Osborne M Reynolds, Jr., The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act:  Time for
Reconsideration, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 459 (1989); Donald N. Zillman, Congress, Courts and Government Tort Liability: Reflections on the Discretionary Function
Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 687; Donald N. Zillman, Regulatory Discretion: The Supreme Court Reexamines the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 110 MIL. L. REV. 115 (1985).
37.   General Dynamics, 139 F.3d at 1285.
38.   Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 282-83. The en banc panel split 7-6.  The dissent did not dispute that the Commissioner’s action in ordering tests was discretionary.
Rather, the dissent accepted “that the decision to withdraw Chilean fruit from the market was proximately caused by the positive test results.”  Id. at 289.  The dissent
concludes that: “once the decision was made to do the testing, the discretionary function exception should not protect the government from the consequences of the
negligence of the laboratory technicians in performing their routine duties.”  Id. at 292.
39.   Id. at 284.
40.   Id. at 286 (emphasis added).  The court correctly noted that:  “The social cost of permitting the inquiries required by the plaintiffs’ theory are prohibitive.”  Id.
41.   Moreover, “[e]ach responsible decision . . . necessarily reflects the decisionmaker’s judgment that it is more desirable to make a decision based on the currently
available information than to wait for more complete data or more confirmation of the existing data.” Id. at 287.
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who exercised discretion and those who influenced the exercise
of that discretion.
In 1987, the oil tanker Glacier Bay ran aground upon a sub-
merged rock in Cook Inlet, Alaska, causing an oil spill.  The
local fishing community sued the corporation with interests in
the oil tanker, for damage to their livelihood.  The government
also sued the corporation for clean-up costs.  The corporation
responded by suing the government for negligence in preparing
the nautical charts used by the Glacier Bay’s captain.  The
charts, prepared as a public service by National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), failed to note the exist-
ence (and, in effect, failed to warn) of what is now known as
“Glacier Bay Rock.”43
The issues the Ninth Circuit faced in Glacier Bay were
whether the hydrographers failed to follow mandatory instruc-
tions44 and whether NOAA reviewers erred by approving the
charts based upon the faulty surveys.  The district court found
that the discretionary function exception applied to the NOAA
reviewers.  As a result, the court dismissed the case because
“the persons who have the ultimate responsibility for approving
the charts . . . have unfettered discretion in reaching that deci-
sion.”45
The appellate court disagreed with the district court about
how to analyze the discretionary function exception.  The court
concluded that “the analysis of the discretionary function
exception must proceed on an act by act basis.  Discretion to
perform one act cannot bring another nondiscretionary act
within the exception’s protection.”46  The discretion accorded to
the NOAA reviewers “would not shield allegedly negligent
non-discretionary acts by the hydrographers.”47  Although the
appellate court affirmed in part, it reversed in part and
remanded the case to the district court on issues relating to
some aspects of the hydrographers’ work.48
In General Dynamics, the Ninth Circuit suggested that,
“while Glacier Bay and Fisher Bros. seem to be in healthy ten-
sion, they are not in opposition unless one or the other is read
in an overly broad fashion.”49  Whether future courts will read
these cases more broadly remains unclear.  Almost fifty years
ago, Professor Davis suggested that, due to the discretionary
exception, FTCA liability was “hardly of consequence in
administrative law.”50  As a result, he suggested that “reformers
and commentors, who have contributed so much to the winning
of the battle to limit sovereign immunity, should probably now
direct their efforts to the difficult problems of fixing proper
boundaries for sovereign liability.”51  These boundaries remain
in flux.52
Guidance from the DOJ
These issues rarely confront agency counsel at the field
activity level.  Interpretation of exceptions to the waiver of sov-
ereign immunity tends to take place in federal district courts.
The DOJ, rather than individual agencies, typically controls the
development of this body of law.  Counsel facing FTCA issues
or, more specifically, considering invoking the discretionary
function exception, should obtain the most recent copy of the
relevant DOJ Torts Branch Monograph.53  The DOJ requests
42.   United Cook Inlet Drift Assocs. v. Trinidad Corp. (In re The Glacier Bay), 71 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (1995). 
43.   Id.
44.   The corporation claimed that the hydrographers failed to follow instructions regarding how widely to space their bottom soundings and under what circumstances
they should investigate bottom anomalies suggesting features such as the now infamous rock.  Id. at 1450.
45.   Id. at 1450-51.
46.   Id. at 1455.
47.   Id. at 1451.
48.   The court concluded that the discretionary function exception did not apply to the hydrographers’ work involving the separation of sounding lines (a maximum
of 50 or 100 meters), the running of splits (or the use of supplemental sounding lines), failure to develop anomalies during a 1964 survey, and a failure to report all of
the above.  See id. at 1452-54.
49.   See General Dynamics, 139 F.3d at 1284-85 (analyzing Fisher Bros. and Glacier Bay).  See also Varig Airlines v. United States, 467 U.S. 797 (1984) (alleging
negligent certification of an aircraft design by the FAA); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (involving a devastating explosion in Texas City, Texas, of a
ship containing fertilizer produced by contractors at government facilities).
50.   See DA VIS, supra note 20, at 810.
51.   Id.  Professor Davis perceived that, while high ranking officials and “governmental units are generally immune from liability for torts committed in the perfor-
mance of discretionary acts [lower level] and so called ministerial officers are liable for torts causing physical harm, and the line between such workers and those
exercising discretionary powers is wavering.”  Id. at 810 (emphasis added).
52.   Members of the DCAA may not care that their “lot in life” was found to be more analogous to that of lab technicians than hydrographers; hopefully, they perceive
that their case turned upon the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that prosecutorial discretion was more closely aligned with policy level decision making at the FDA than a
nautical map review at NOAA.
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that:  “In the interest of presenting a consistent and coherent
defense, the discretionary function exception should not be
raised in any suit without the prior approval of the Torts
Branch.”54
The DOJ leaves no doubt that it takes these cases very seri-
ously.  It emphasizes the importance of a strong record. The
DOJ further suggests that “it is critical to identify the agency
policy implicated in the claim . . . .”55  In addition, counsel must
be prepared to “articulate the agency’s political, economic,
social or military policies . . . .”56  In the Torts Branch Mono-
graph, the DOJ articulates several key principles that agency
attorneys should consider when raising the discretionary func-
tion exception.  For example, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof when the government asserts the discretionary function
exception.57  Negligence is not relevant in conducting the dis-
cretionary function analysis.58  Also, although it should be
raised expeditiously, the jurisdictional defense of the discre-
tionary function cannot be waived.59
Conclusion
Although the government should savor the result in General
Dynamics, 60 caution remains in order.  Cynics could conclude
that, while the government “dodged a bullet,” there is another
“chink in the armor.”  This issue split the Ninth Circuit, just as
it aggravated that court in Glacier Bay.  Similarly, the Fisher
Bros. case almost equally split the en banc Third Circuit.  As a
bystander, the lesson from these cases may be no more than to
acknowledge that discretionary decision-makers should exer-
cise an appropriate level of care when they rely on the work of
others for their decisions.61  Taxpayers (and, implicitly the
courts) have a right to expect that policy-makers will marshal
and consider appropriate facts before exercising discretion.
Government counsel, however, cannot afford to be bystand-
ers.  In exercising discretion, counsel must rely on the reliable
and challenge the unreliable.  For others exercising discretion,
counsel can offer advice on what requires further examination
and investigation.  Right or wrong, decisions must be made.
Whether counsel make those decisions or support the decision-
maker, the taxpayer is entitled to counsel’s best judgment.
53.   This multi-volume work is dedicated to FTCA issues.  The monograph devoted two volumes to the discretionary function exception.  Part A (1993) offers an
updated analysis of the evolving law.  Part B (1997) includes a digest of authorities (since 1984) plus a listing of cases (alphabetically, and by agency).  See U.S. DEP’T
OF
 JUSTICE, DISCRETION ARY FU NCTIO N EX CEPTION, TO RTS BRA NCH MO NO GRAPH, pt. A, Forward, 51-52 (1993) (emphasis in original).
54.   Id.  The DOJ implores agencies to “[p]lease keep in mind that the discretionary function defense is not to be used as an ‘extra throw-in’ defense, and should be
asserted only when applicable.”  Id. at 53.
55.   Id. at 52.  The DOJ encourages review of relevant “regulations, guidelines, directives, or policy statements . . . .”  Id. 
56.   Id.
57.   This may seem counter-intuitive to litigators, who assume that the moving party bears the burden.  Conversely, while the government is the moving party seeking
to dismiss the action, the plaintiff maintains the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction.  “To carry the burden of establishing an unequivocal waiver
of immunity under § 1346(b) . . . a plaintiff must plead and prove that § 2680(a) is inapplicable.”  Id. at 28-31.
58.   Id. at 32-33.
59.   Id. at 27-28.
60.   Conversely, it is difficult to see how this result reconciles with the Supreme Court’s statement in Kosak v. United States, that the objectives of the FTCA’s excep-
tions are:  “[E]nsuring that ‘certain governmental activities’ not be disrupted by the threat of damage suits; avoiding exposure of the United States to liability for
excessive or fraudulent claims; and not extending the coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already available.”  Kosak v. United States, 465
U.S. 848, 858 (1984).
61.   See Michael N. Hayes, Sovereign Immunity in an Economic Theory of Government Behavior, 12 LAW & POL’Y 293 (July 1990) (providing a more in-depth theory
on applying the discretionary function exception, from a behavioral standpoint).  Professor Hayes suggests that courts follow a “theoretically consistent path” that
“[t]he government should be immune from tort suit for monetary damages if and only if it demonstrates that it decided, after weighing social costs and benefits, to
risk the occurrence of some loss . . . .”  Id. at 307 (citing M.L. Spitzer, An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 515 (1977)).  Professor
Hayes further suggests that “the presence of an explicit cost-benefit analysis on the part of any specific government agent readily identifies a discretionary function.”
Id. at 308.
